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Labor intensive sectors such as the specialty crop sector have historically had
strong reliance on foreign labor, constituting roughly one-fifth of all U.S. farms while
incurring roughly two-thirds of direct-hire expenses. It is estimated that more than half
unauthorized of the foreign-born labor force in the specialty crop sector are unauthorized
for US employment; however, adjusting current unauthorized farm workers to a legal
status may be viewed as a ‘reward’ for violating federal immigration laws. Using data
from the National Agricultural Workers Survey for 1989-2014, this study utilizes a
treatment effects approach (via propensity score matching and minimum-biased
estimation) to evaluate the farm wage implications of legalization of foreign-born
specialty crop farm workers nationally, as well as specifically in California. Positive
wage effects are estimated in nationally and in California, with higher magnitude effects
observed in California.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Foreign born workers have consistently comprised a significant proportion of the
hired labor force in the U.S. agricultural industry over the past several decades. This has
been most evident in the dairy, meatpacking and specialty crop sectors (Martin, 2017;
Artz, Orazem, and Otto, 2007; Krumel, 2017). The specialty crop industry – specifically
the fruit, vegetable and horticultural (FVH) sector – is unique in that it is the most labor
intensive relative to all other agricultural inputs. In this sector, labor availability impacts
the choice of production technologies, cropping patterns, and the competitiveness of U.S.
producers relative to low-cost foreign producers (Boucher and Taylor, 2007).
According to the 2012 Census of Agriculture, FVH farms constituted 21% of total
U.S. farms, however, they accounted for 63% of the $19 billion of direct-hire expenses
and 80% of the $5.3 billion of contract crop labor expenses (Martin, 2014). FVH farms
had the highest hired labor costs in 2016, with vegetable farms, fruit and nut farms, and
greenhouse/nursery farms reporting an estimated $3.2 billion, $5.5 billion, and $4.7
billion in hired labor costs, respectively (Rural Migration News, 2017). Other crops such
as soybeans, cotton, and corn, have been able to successfully implement mechanization
and have experienced increases in productivity and decreases in labor costs.
In comparison, FVH farms tend to use labor intensively and have had fewer
options for mechanization given the nature of their products, which are usually ill suited
1

for such advancements. Many specialty crops, specifically fresh fruits and vegetables, are
sold to a consumer base that demands produce with minimal damage, bruising, and
blemishes. Further, these crops tend to be highly perishable and have short windows
during which produce must be harvested. Mechanization adoption in the U.S. FVH
subsector has hinged upon benefit-cost decisions in which the cost and availability of
farm labor is taken into account. Implementing mechanization requires large capital
commitments, changes in field configurations, and potentially an overall change in the
farming operation (Huffman, 2012).
Over time, these factors appear to have disincentivized innovation in suitable
mechanized options and encourage reliance on farm labor, despite much of the labor
force lacking US employment authorization. The risk that this poses is not lost on
producers, and it has sparked much concern among producers/producer groups to date.
According to Krogstad, Passel, and Cohn (2017), undocumented immigrants are
overrepresented in farming, constituting 26% of all farm workers, when compared to
their estimated 5% share of the civilian labor force. In terms of hired labor on crop farms
however, the representation is more pronounced. According to the 2013-2014 National
Agricultural Workers Survey (NAWS) findings, 73% of all hired crop farm workers were
foreign born, and only 53% of these workers were authorized to work in the United States
(Hernandez, Gabbard, and Caroll, 2016).
In 2014, there was an estimated 43.2 million immigrants living the U.S., a
fourfold increase since 1960 (Lopez and Radford, 2017). While the U.S. immigrant
population has significantly increased, the undocumented immigrant population has
stabilized and become more settled (Passel and Cohn 2016), with 66% having lived in the
2

U.S. for at least 10 years (Krogstad, Passel, and Cohn, 2017). An estimated 70% of the
roughly 1.8 million crop-farm workers employed yearly were born in Mexico and it is
estimated that half of all U.S. crop farm workers lack proper U.S. work authorization
(Martin, 2017). Consequently, the decrease in migratory workers from Mexico to the
U.S. since the 2008-2009 recession has contributed to some uncertainty for farms which
rely on such labor to remain profitable (Villarreal, 2014). With the changes in
immigration trends and the current political environment, farmers are understandably
concerned that immigration reform, especially regarding the increased stringency of
immigration enforcement advocated for by the Trump Administration, may disrupt labor
supply and curb their access to workers. Fewer workers could lead to an increase in labor
costs and adversely affect U.S. producers’ competitiveness in the global market for FVH
products (Calvin and Martin, 2010).
Given that a substantial proportion of the workforce is foreign born and
unauthorized for US employment, it is important to consider the effects that changes in
immigration policy may have, particularly in light of recent policy positions that have
been proposed by the Trump Administration. On immigration policy, the Trump
Administration has indicated a preference for increased internal and border enforcement
and a tightening of rules that could directly impact how foreign-born individuals migrate
to and how they may operate within the United States. Prior to the Administration’s
actions however, several states had already begun to enter into 287(g) agreements with
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). These agreements allow a state or
local law enforcement entities to enter into a partnership with ICE, under joint
memoranda of agreement arrangements in order to receive delegated authority for
3

immigration enforcement within their jurisdictions. Currently, twenty states have
ongoing agreements with ICE (US-ICE, 2018).
Past immigration policy proposals have tended to reflect increased border and
interior enforcement, increased severity of employer sanctions, and paths to legalization.
Legalization remains a point of contention as there remains considerable disagreement
over whether this would be appropriate or whether it would ‘reward’ undocumented
workers for violating federal immigration laws. Farm worker advocates see it as a means
for workers to acquire just compensation for their labor, as it has been shown that legal
farmworkers earn more than their undocumented cohorts (Taylor, 1992; Isé and Perloff,
1995; Walters, Emerson, and Iwai, 2008). While not opposed to employing a legalized
workforce, farm employers have expressed concern about immigration reform that may
restrict their access to foreign workers, increase wage rates and stress profits in the short
run; particularly in the absence of a more efficient guest worker program. The current H2A temporary agricultural worker/guest worker program has often been criticized for
being cumbersome and bureaucratic. It has been cited as a major obstacle in the timely
employment of legal foreign workers, since the complexities of the program has
occasionally resulted in delayed arrivals of workers on farms. Given the perishable
nature of FVH crops and the time sensitive nature of harvests, such occurrences can be
costly for agricultural producers.
This study uses a treatment effects framework to evaluate the farm wage
implications of legalization, and to make comparisons between the national and regional
level earnings outcomes. This study is similar to previous work (Walters, Emerson, and
Iwai, 2008; Kandilov and Kandilov, 2010) that have argued that farm workers self-select
4

into legal status, but goes further to assess the outcomes on national and regional levels.
Specifically, this study (a) evaluates the impact of legal status on farm worker earnings
outcomes for authorized and unauthorized workers in the U.S. crop farm workforce, and
(b) assesses the differences in potential earnings outcomes at the national and regional
levels.
Propensity score matching and bias minimizing treatment effects estimation
techniques are used to estimate three population means: (1) the average treatment effect,
(2) the average treatment effect on the untreated, and (3) the average treatment effect on
the treated. These methods address the underlying self-selection process, whether arising
from observed or unobserved sources. This study uses data for 1989-2014 from the
National Agricultural Workers Survey (NAWS), which is a rich nationally representative
data set. It is an employment-based, random-sample survey of U.S. crop workers that
collects demographic, employment, and health data in face-to-face interviews. It also
collects data on the legal status of survey respondents.
Following this introduction, section two reviews the relevant literature. Section
three describes the methods and model specification, and section four discusses the
results. The study concludes with a discussion of the findings and potential future
research directions.

5

CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Studies that have analyzed wage effects of legalization have determined that
obtaining legal status has a positive effect on the average earnings of foreign-born farm
workers. They found that unauthorized immigrants experience an estimated 5 to 15%
wage penalty when compared to their legalized counterparts (Taylor 1992; Cobb-Clark,
Shiells, and Lowell, 1995; Rivera-Batiz, 1999; Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark, 2002; Iwai,
Emerson and Walters, 2006; Walters, Emerson and Iwai, 2008; Kandilov and Kandilov,
2010; Nisbet and Rodgers III, 2013; Borjas, 2017).
In an influential article on legal status and immigrant farmworker wages, Taylor
(1992) presented theoretical framework and empirical evidence of the wage implications
of legal status for immigrant farmworkers. The study used data from a 1983 survey
conducted by the University of California and the California Employment Development,
and the Heckman two-step procedure was used to model the selection process into legal
status and job type. He found that unauthorized immigrants select into low-skill, lowpaying farm jobs and therefore experience lower earnings than their authorized
counterparts. Alluding to the theory of human capital developed by Chiswick (1978),
Taylor argued that the lack of legal status creates a barrier to higher earnings and job
mobility for unauthorized immigrant farmworkers. He found that unauthorized workers
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earned less than authorized workers, and concluded that that lack of legal status serves as
a barrier to job mobility, and adversely affects earnings potential.
In their study, Isé and Perloff (1995) separated legal status into five different
categories and used a multinomial logit to explain the probability of a certain legal status
as a function of demographic characteristics. Their analysis utilized National Agricultural
Workers Survey data (1989-1991) and Lee’s extension of Heckman’s two-step procedure
to mitigate selection bias and obtain consistent wage estimates. The authors found that
authorized foreign-born workers earned 15% more, on average, increase and per week
than unauthorized workers.
Rivera-Batiz (1999), using data drawn from the Legalized Population Survey for
the years 1989-1992, analyzed the impact of legalization programs implemented through
the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, on previously unauthorized workers
(in all sectors), and examined the earnings of unauthorized Mexican immigration in the
U.S. labor market. The analysis yielded wage differentials of 41.8% between authorized
and unauthorized Mexican immigrants. The study highlighted differences in human
capital and demographic characteristics between the two groups, and how those
differences alone do not account for the entirety of the wage gap between unauthorized
and authorized Mexican immigrants. While Rivera-Batiz suggests that the difference in
legal status provides positive wage effects for those who acquired it, it is unclear how
much of the wage effect can be directly attributed to changes in legal status, that is, from
an unauthorized to authorized status.
Using panel data from Legalized Population Surveys (1989 and 1992 survey
rounds), Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark (2002) utilized a quasi-experimental method and the
7

non-equivalent group technique to perform their analysis. The authors’ results show that
immigrant workers who became legalized gained more from investing in their own
human capital. They asserted that post-legalization gains are mainly a product of changes
to human capital (Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark, 2002). Interestingly, the authors found that
the gains were most pronounced in California. The authors theorized that the relatively
liberal labor market in California may have created an environment that eased the
operation of legalization programs. Furthermore, the authors found that post-legalization
wages for individuals who were previously unauthorized increased by approximately 6%.
In addition, the authors estimated that entry wages for unauthorized workers would have
been 14% higher had the workers been legal (Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark, 2002). Also, the
authors found that “the changes occurring for legalized men did result from their new
legal status rather than from macroeconomic conditions associated with the particular
timing of the data” (p. 623).
Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark (2002) highlighted one way to deal with a specific
difficulty regarding identification of the potential wage effects of legalization—the lack
of observationally similar groups of unauthorized workers and groups of authorized
workers which are necessary if one wishes to determine wage differences due specifically
to legalization. Other studies (Ise and Perloff, 1995; Cobb-Clark, Shiells, and Lowell,
1995; Rivera-Batiz 1999; Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark, 2002; Kaushal, 2006) have also
referenced this problem in their studies, but each utilized various methods to overcome
this difficulty. Cobb-Clark, Shells, and Lowell (1995) studied the effects of employer
sanctions and legalization on wages by deriving an equilibrium wage from separate labor
and supply equations via a standard least-squares dummy variables estimation procedure
8

and also a two-stage least squares procedure. Rivera-Batiz (1999) calculated human
capital earnings functions from data gathered from a sample of unauthorized Mexican
immigrant interviews and from legal Mexican immigrants counted in the U.S. Census.
Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark (2002) utilized a quasi-experimental method and the nonequivalent group technique, and Kaushal (2006) utilized difference-in-difference
methodology.
Iwai, Emerson and Walters (2006) used data from the National Agricultural
Workers Survey for 1989-2004 to estimate U.S. farmworker wage differentials by legal
status via a Heckman-type two-stage estimation method to control for selection bias
issues, with an ordered probit model in the first stage and a wage equation model in the
second stage. They determined that workers that were authorized for employment in US
farm work had earned higher wages on average than those who lacked authorization for
US employment.
Walters, Emerson, and Iwai (2008) used a treatment effects approach that utilized
parametric and nonparametric methods to evaluate the wage implications of legal status
for foreign born crop workers in the United States. In this context, legal status was used
as the “treatment” to assess the potential earnings outcomes for authorized versus
unauthorized foreign born farmworkers.

The study used National Agricultural Workers

Survey data for 1989 to 2006. The study findings indicated a positive wage effect due to
legal status that was consistent with findings by previous research (Taylor, 1992; Isé and
Perloff, 1995; Iwai, Emerson, and Walters, 2006).
Kandilov and Kandilov (2010) evaluated the effect of legal status on wages and
health insurance of foreign-born farmworkers utilizing data for 2000-2006 from the
9

National Agricultural Workers Survey. The authors employed propensity score matching
techniques and focused on a subset of single male farmworkers that were employed
fulltime in US farm work. They reported a wage gain of roughly 5% in average wages
of undocumented workers due to legalization, which is consistent with previous findings
in the literature.
Nisbet and Rodgers III (2013) argued that the tweaks to U.S. immigration policy,
social policy, and overall migration trends since the implementation of the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) have shaped the farm labor market, specifically
the structure of wages, for both authorized and unauthorized U.S. farm workers. The
authors noted that U.S. policymakers have catered to and addressed the needs of
employers within the agricultural sector through policy creation and assert that “policy
can influence wage differentials by shifting labor supply and demand, workers
characteristics, employment practices, or a changing balance of power between workers
and employers” ( p. 11), further highlighting the fact that immigration policy is highly
complicated and contains far-reaching implications that are difficult to fully account for.
In their analysis, using National Agricultural Workers Survey (NAWS) data
spanning from 1990-2009, the authors estimated a log wage function in order to estimate
the unadjusted wage gap between the authorized and unauthorized farmworkers. The
authors then identified the key predictors of the wage differential between authorized and
unauthorized workers, by utilizing decomposition techniques1. Finally, the authors
decomposed the changes in the wage gap across time. They found that between 1990 and

1

Used in Oaxaca (1973).
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1994, the unadjusted wage gap declined (from 8.0 to 3.4%) due to the impact of the
IRCA on relative wages. They determined that by 2004, the wage gap increased to
14.6%, and attributed this to the immigration and immigration-related policy changes (the
North American Free Trade Agreement, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act, and the Patriot Act). The wage gap stabilized between 2004 and 2009
(between 13.1 to 15.2%), a finding which the authors did not expect but attributed
perhaps to changing migration trends (Nisbet and Rodgers III, 2013). In conclusion, the
authors argued that IRCA changed the nature of the labor market in the agricultural
sector— wage differences grew and returns to measured characteristics differed2
according to legal status (Nisbet and Rodgers III, 2013).
Using data from the Community Population Survey for years 1994-2014, Borjas
(2017) analyzed wage differences between the legalized immigrants, unauthorized
immigrants, and natives. He determined that unauthorized workers earned lower wages
owing to their undocumented status, with a wage penalty ranging from 10 to 12 %. The
wage penalty in Borjas’ (2017) paper is defined as “the wage gap between
observationally equivalent undocumented and legal immigrants” (Borjas, 2017, p. 27).
These calculations revealed an interesting trend: between 2005 and 2014, the wage
penalty for unauthorized men shrank from 9.1 to 3.4% (Borjas, 2017). Borjas concluded

2

The authors used the Juhn Murphy Pierce (1991) decomposition. Measured characteristics included: years

of schooling, job tenure, English speaking ability, age, reading ability, migration status, and demographic
measures such as birthplace, race, gender, marital status, and number of children. Significant characteristics
included: job tenure, English speaking ability, years of schooling and age.
.
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that the enactment of a regularization program may have only a modest effect on wages
earned by undocumented workers.
In a discussion article on agricultural labor markets and immigration, Emerson
(2007) outlined how wage rates could be affected under alternative immigration policy
scenarios. He argued that if it were the case that all workers were authorized for US
employment via full legalization and producers had access to guest workers, but that no
changes in technology occurred (so that the structure of labor demand remained
unchanged), then market-determined wage rates could be expected to remain at the levels
observed for the legal workers. The only difference would be the absence of a wage
penalty for the formerly undocumented workers and higher direct wage costs for
employers (Emerson, 2007). Alternatively, if all undocumented workers were removed
with limited or no replacement guest workers and borders were closed, there could be
increased agricultural wages given fixed technology and product mix, and capital
immobility, at least in the short term (Emerson, 2007). Alluding to the benefits of
temporary or permanent immigrant labor that could boost the U.S. economy, Emerson
argued that immigrant workers and complementary factors of production, including
capital, land and complementary labor, would capture the gains, while losses would be
absorbed by substitute labor.
While the previous studies have been focused at the national level, this study has
an additional component that looks at the potential effects at the regional level, and it
assesses these over a longer time frame. In terms of the overall methodological approach
and assessing the treatment effects, it is similar to work by Walters, Emerson and Iwai
(2008) and Kandilov and Kandilov (2010). However, Kandilov and Kandilov (2010)
12

restricted their analysis to a six year sample of unmarried male farmworkers, and only
used propensity score matching to analyze the wage effects of legalization, whereas this
study does not. Finally, while this study uses propensity score matching (PSM), it also
uses a minimum-biased estimation (MBE) method proposed by Millimet and Tchernis
(2013) to check robustness of the PSM. Whereas PSM is appropriate for addressing
selection bias from observed factors, the MBE is appropriate where selection bias arises
from factors that are unobservable to researchers. In the context of this research,
education and experience are examples of characteristics (factors) that would be
observed, whereas an immigrant worker’s motivation and reaction to news on
immigration policies or laws are factors that are likely to be unobserved by researchers.
The MBE method was not used in either of the previous studies, and to the best of my
knowledge, it has not been applied in the context of farm labor and immigration policy
research.
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CHAPTER III
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Mincer Earnings Functions
Earnings functions as developed by Mincer (1958 and 1974) provide a standard
framework for characterizing individuals’ earning profiles as a function of years of
education (human capital stock) and experience (post-schooling investments). In the
context of this study, the use of human capital earnings functions is attractive because it
allows for the inclusion of other variables that could possibly affect individuals’ earnings
(Chiswick, 2003). The Mincer earnings functions assumes that human capital stocks are
homogenous, that individuals would choose to maximize their present value earnings,
and that individuals have the same rates of return on their investments in human capital.
Log earnings is specified as:
ln y = f(S, Exp, Exp2

(1)

where y, S, and EXP represent earnings, years of schooling (education) and postschooling (on-the-job training) investments, respectively. In equation 1, observed
earnings ( ln y ) is expressed as a concave function dependent upon the individual’s labor
market experience and schooling. It is assumed that on-the-job training (post-schooling
investment) declines over an individual’s lifetime and schooling lasts S years (Polachek,
2007).
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There are a few important empirical implications advanced by Mincer earnings
function. The first being that individuals’ earnings levels are related to human capital
investments, implying that the higher the human capital investment, the higher the
earnings. The second being that individuals’ earnings functions exhibit concavity,
meaning that earnings rise at a decreasing rate throughout an individual’s life. This
concavity was first identified by Mincer (1974), and this finding holds when adjustments
for selectivity bias have been made (Hartog, Pfann, and Ridder, 1989; Kiker and Mendes
de Oliveira, 1992; Baldwin, Zeager, and Flacco, 1994; Gibson and Fatai, 2006).
Thomas Lemieux (2006) and Das and Polachek (2017) discussed the practicality
and popularity of the log earnings function in research focusing on various issues. By
adding categorical dummy variables to equation 1, the basic function can be modified to
produce estimates of differences in earnings across different subgroupings within a
population (Das and Polachek, 2017). Of particular relevance regarding migration are
papers produced by Chiswick (1978) and Borjas (1982, 1985, 1993). Other studies
utilizing Mincer earnings functions to analyze differences in wages stemming from
gender (Suter and Miller, 1973), college major (Webber, 2014), beauty (Hamermesh and
Biddle, 1994; Scholz and Sicinski, 2015), bilingualism (Saiz and Zoido, 2005), and
veteran status (Gabriel, 2016), and other issues have been performed, further highlighting
the value and the adaptability of the Mincer earnings functions and the underlying theory.
Treatment Effects Approach
The treatment effects framework analyzes the outcomes of treatments, or interventions,
on a designated treatment group against an un-treated group. It is important to note that
“the term outcome refers to changes in economic status or environment on the economic
15

outcomes of individuals” (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, p. 860). In the realm of
economics, this framework is particularly useful for analyzing policy interventions
because treatments that lead to successful outcomes can relate to social program
implementation or improvements to meet certain social policy objectives.
Inferring a causal connection between the treatment and the outcome is the
standard problem of the treatment effects framework. The treatment in this study is
defined as the legalization of unauthorized workers in the specialty crop sector. Because
the treatment variable (legal status) is binary, making it impossible to observe the same
individual in both states at the same time; causal connections must be inferred using
counterfactuals. In the context of this study, the wage effect (outcome) of a change in
legal status (treatment) is of primary interest. Since we are interested mainly in the wage
effect caused by the ‘switching’ of the binary treatment variable, causation is identified
ceteris paribus, signifying that all other independent variables are held constant. There is
a participant group (D*=1) (treated) (authorized) and a non-participant group (D*=0)
(untreated) (unauthorized), with 𝑌1 denoting the outcome for the treated group and 𝑌0
denoting the outcome for the untreated group. The treatment effect being is denoted as
the causal effect of the treatment on the outcome (Long, 1997). The value in this
framework is found in its evaluation of the change in a participating individual’s average
economic outcome against those individuals who choose not to participate (Cameron and
Trivedi, 2005). Individuals included in the non-participant group are used to form a
benchmark to estimate the changes brought about by the treatment.
The first step of the analysis utilizes a binary choice model to estimate the
likelihood that the worker is either authorized or unauthorized. The wage effect of legal
16

status is captured via the use of propensity score matching. Heckman, Tobias and
Vytlacil (2001) and Blundell and Costa Dias (2002) use a latent variable framework and
define the potential outcomes based on observable characteristics (x), and the
participation decision for a program as:
𝑌1 = 𝑔1 (𝑥) + 𝑢1 = 𝛽′1 𝑋𝑖 + 𝑢1

(treated)

(2)

𝑌0 = 𝑔0 (𝑥) + 𝑢1 = 𝛽′0 𝑋𝑖 + 𝑢0

(untreated)

(3)

𝐷∗ = 𝛼′𝑍𝑖

(where: D=1 if D*≥0; D=0 otherwise)
D=1 when treated
D=0 when untreated

(4)

In equations (2) to (3) above, 𝑔0 (𝑥) and 𝑔1 (𝑥) denote the relationship between the
observable characteristics and the potential outcomes (𝑌1 , 𝑌0 ). The decision to participate
in treatment is denoted by the binary treatment variable D, which is equal to 1 if the
individual chooses to select into legalization, whereas it is equal to zero if the individual
chooses to refrain from legalization. Unobserved variables are denoted by 𝑢1 , 𝑢0 , and Z,
while observed random variables are denoted by X. Errors are assumed to be independent
of X and Z. The treatment effect is expressed by equation (5), and is equal to the
difference between the potential outcomes, all else remaining the same:
△𝑖 = 𝑌1𝑖 − 𝑌0𝑖

(for i=1,..,N)

(5)

However, we are unable to observe that change because we would need data that captures
the wages of a legalized foreign-born crop worker as well as the wages that the same
foreign-born worker earned while working in an unauthorized state, highlighting the
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necessity of some type of matching methods.
We can rewrite (2) and (3) as follows:
𝑌1 = 𝐸(𝑌1 |𝑋𝑖 ) + 𝑢1 = 𝜇1 (𝑋𝑖 ) + 𝑢1 (outcome for the treated)

(6)

Y0 = E(Y0 |Xi ) + u0 = μ0 (Xi ) + u0 (outcome for the untreated)

(7)

This specification is akin to the switching regression type in that the treated and nontreated groups have different conditional mean functions, 𝜇0 (𝑋𝑖 ) and 𝜇1 (𝑋𝑖 ). It is
assumed that 𝐸(𝜇1 |𝑋𝑖 ) = 𝐸(𝜇0 |𝑋𝑖 ) = 0, however the same equality is not assumed for
𝐸(𝜇1 |𝑋𝑖 , 𝐷) and 𝐸(𝜇0 |𝑋𝑖 , 𝐷). Thus, the observed outcome is expressed as:
(8)

𝑌𝑖 = 𝐷𝑖 𝑌1𝑖 + (1 − 𝐷𝑖 )𝑌0𝑖

in which the portion of the treatment effect which is unobservable is known as the
counterfactual outcome. Thus, for individuals that are authorized, 𝑌0 would be the
counterfactual outcome, whereas for individuals that are unauthorized, 𝑌1 would be the
counterfactual outcome. Combining equations (6), (7), and (8), we get:
𝑌𝑖 = 𝐷𝑖 (𝜇1 (𝑋𝑖 )+𝑢1 ) + (1 − 𝐷𝑖 )(𝜇0 (𝑋𝑖 ) + 𝑢0 )
= 𝜇0 (𝑋𝑖 ) + 𝐷𝑖 (𝜇1 (𝑋𝑖 ) − 𝜇0 (𝑋𝑖 )+𝑢1 − 𝑢0 ) +𝑢0

(9)

In equation (9), the second term in the equation ‘switches’ on and off because 𝐷𝑖 is the
binary treatment variable denoting legal status. The entire second term in (9) show the
benefit of receiving the treatment, with (𝜇1 (𝑋𝑖 ) − 𝜇0 (𝑋𝑖 )) capturing the average gain for
a participant and (𝑢1 − 𝑢0 ) demonstrating the specific benefit available only to the
participant (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). It is important to note that the treatment effect
of each individual is independent of the treatment effect of others, meaning that an
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individual’s potential outcomes are a function of his participation decision only
(Woolridge, 2002; Caliendo, 2006).
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CHAPTER IV
METHODS
Treatment Effects via Propensity Score Matching
In non-experimental economic studies, when treatment participation is not
random, and instead is reliant upon observed variables, propensity scores may apply
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). Individuals in the authorized group are directly compared
to matching individuals in an unauthorized group, which allows for the estimation of
treatment effects as if a controlled experiment had been conducted. Unfortunately, exact
matches do not exist for all authorized individuals.
To correct for these problems, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), proposed a
propensity score that increases the balance (the similarity between the distribution of X in
the control and treatment groups) by estimating a propensity score for each observation
and then matching on that propensity score. The propensity score measures the likelihood
that an individual selects into the treatment group. Most propensity scores are found
using a logistic regression as expressed in equation (10):
P(Di = 1|Xi ) =

eF(Xi )
1−eF(Xi )

(10)

where the propensity score 𝑃(𝐷𝑖 = 1|𝑋𝑖 ) is the probability that Di equals 1 given Xi and
F(Xi) is a function of the explanatory variables. The propensity score is used to create
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matches between authorized and unauthorized individuals to estimate the treatment
effects. This study utilizes a logit regression to generate these propensity scores.
In treatment effects estimation, the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA)
is an important assumption. It states that conditional on observed variables 𝑋𝑖 the
potential outcomes are independent of treatment (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005):
(Y0 , Y1 ⊥ Di )|Xi

(11)

If it holds, then the matching estimator should perform as expected (Rosenbaum and
Rubin, 1983; Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 1997; Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; Smith and
Todd, 2005). Presuming this assumption holds, it is understood that treatment status is
random conditional upon the vector of observable variables, 𝑋𝑖 . Thus, matching is a
quasi-experimental technique used to replicate actual experimental conditions. It is
satisfied as long as 𝑋𝑖 includes all of the variables which affect the selection into
treatment and the outcome (Kandilov and Kandilov, 2010).
Using data from the National Agricultural Workers Survey (NAWS), Kandilov and
Kandilov (2010) employed propensity score matching techniques3 to compare single
male legal permanent residents employed in crop farm work to an appropriate control
group of unauthorized workers, in order to analyze the effects of legalization on the
wages and benefits. Other studies that have employed the propensity score matching
techniques include Dehejia and Wahba (2002) to identify the wage effects of job training
programs, and Yasar and Morrison Paul (2008) to analyze the impact of foreign
technology transfer on plant productivity. Additionally, Liu and Lynch (2011) use

3

As developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)
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propensity score matching methods to examine the effects of agricultural preservation
programs and changes in farmland loss.
Using PSM, we are able to estimate three population means:
1. Average Treatment Effect (ATE): The expected gain that a randomly selected
individual accrues from participating in a program:
𝛼𝐴𝑇𝐸 = 𝐸(∆) = 𝐸(𝑌1 ) − 𝐸(𝑌0 ) = 𝐸(𝑌1 |𝑋𝑖 , 𝐷 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌0 |𝑋𝑖 , 𝐷 = 0)

(12)

In (12), 𝐸(∆) denotes the expected difference between the two different outcomes
(𝑌1 and 𝑌0 ); 𝐸(𝑌1 |𝑋𝑖 , 𝐷 = 1) denotes the outcome (wage rate) for an individual
conditional upon a vector of observed variables, 𝑋𝑖 , and D=1 (denoting that the
observation has been treated (authorized)), and 𝐸(𝑌0 |𝑋𝑖 , 𝐷 = 0 denotes the
outcome for the individual conditional upon the same vector of observed
variables, 𝑋𝑖 , and D=0 (denoting that the observations is untreated
(unauthorized)).
2. Average Treatment Effect on the Untreated (ATEU): The effect for nonparticipants if they would have participated. The ATEU may be useful in future
policy decisions regarding the extension of the treatment to excluded groups
(Caliendo, 2006). In the context of this study, the ATEU would yield information
related to the wage effect that an unauthorized worker could experience if the
worker gained legal status. This would also yield information to the grower
related to costs of labor if a large-scale legalization program was targeted at the
agricultural sector. The ATEU is mathematically expressed as:
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αATEU = E(∆|D = 0) = E(Y1 |D = 0) − E(Y0 |D = 0)

(13)

Where 𝐸(∆|𝐷 = 0) denotes the expected difference in the outcome (wage rate)
given the individual is untreated (unauthorized); 𝐸(𝑌1 |𝐷 = 0) denotes the
expected outcome for the untreated individual if they had decided to participate in
the treatment (authorization), and 𝐸(𝑌0 |𝐷 = 0) denotes the outcome for the
untreated individual that remained in an unauthorized status.
3. Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET): The average gain from the
treatment on those who opt into the treatment (Heckman, Tobias, and Vytlacil,
2001). That is, the gain in wage for those who decide to obtain legal status. The
ATET is mathematically expressed as:
αATET = E(∆|D = 1) = E(Y1 |D = 1) − E(Y0 |D = 1)

(14)

where 𝐸(∆|𝐷 = 1) denotes the expected change in the outcome (wage rate) given
that the individual is treated (authorized); 𝐸(𝑌1 |𝐷 = 1) denotes the expected
outcome for treated individual; and 𝐸(𝑌0 |𝐷 = 1) denotes the expected outcome
for the treated individual had they selected to refrain from gaining legal status.
Selection Bias
An issue that arises in the calculation for the ATET is that of selection bias.
Selection bias poses a challenge and appears in the ATET, in that the ATET includes a
hypothetical outcome of lack of treatment for the individuals who actually received the
treatment (Caliendo, 2006). If using non-experimental data, as is the case with this study,
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this outcome will not be the same as the outcome for those individuals who did not
receive treatment (i.e., gain legal status). Selection bias occurs when individuals elect
whether to partake in the treatment (gain legal status), or to refrain from participating in
the treatment. The decision to pursue legal status arguably involves weighing the costs
and perceived benefits of obtaining legal status, and factors that may not be easily
observed or measured by a researcher. Intuitively, individuals who would benefit most
from gaining legal status, take deliberate actions to gain legal status; this therefore
introduces positive selection-bias into the ATET. Proper randomization of the treatment
(authorization) would circumvent self-selection issues. However, the deliberate selection
into treatment makes proper randomization difficult to achieve, highlighting the need for
estimation methods that take selection bias into account.
There are two general sources of selection issues – (a) selection on observables
and (b) selection on unobservables. Selection on observables implies that we, as
researchers, can observe all of the variables that impact an individual’s decision to
participate in treatment and therefore affect the outcome. Selection on unobservables
implies that we cannot observe some of the variables that impact the individual’s decision
to participate in the treatment and the subsequent outcome. If an individual is selecting
into treatment based on observables, it is assumed that treatment assignment is random
conditional upon a specified vector of observable covariates, therefore providing a
randomization of treatment and circumventing the selection issue. Selection on
observables is known as the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA) or
unconfoundedness. The CIA is satisfied if the vector of observed variables includes all
the variables which affect the participation and outcome. If selection bias occurs as a
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result of observed factors, linear regression techniques and propensity score matching are
appropriate estimation methods.
When an individual selects on unobservables, randomization of treatment is
difficult to achieve. Selecting on unobservables suggest that unobservable variables drive
the individual’s decision to participate in the treatment, and thus nonrandom assignment
into treatment occurs and becomes a concern. Instrumental variables are one remedy
when faced with issues stemming from selection on unobservables; however, in the
context of this study, a valid instrument that is correlated with the decision and
uncorrelated with the outcome is unavailable. For this reason, we employ a minimum
bias estimation method in this study.
Bias-Minimizing Treatment Effects
To address bias that may occur due to unobserved variables, this study utilizes the
minimum-biased estimator (MBE) proposed by Millimet and Tchernis (2013). This
estimator allows for the bias to be minimized when the CIA fails – that is, when bias
stemming from unobserved factors play a role. Thus, the motivation behind using the
minimum-biased treatment effects estimation; it addresses issues regarding the efficacy
of the CIA and subsequently the potential bias of the propensity score estimates, and
deals directly with selection bias arising from unobserved variables.
Assuming that observations select on unobservables, the MBE trims the
estimation sample to include only observations with propensity scores that lie within a
certain interval. If the CIA holds, the MBE yields unbiased estimations, and works to
minimize the bias when the CIA fails (Millimet and Tchernis, 2013). The MBE estimator
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draws heavily from Heckman’s bivariate normal selection model to provide an estimate
of the bias of estimators when the CIA fails.
Millimet and Tchernis (2013) propose that through the use of observations with
propensity scores around the Bias-Minimizing Propensity Score (BMPS), P*, the bias
from the failure of the CIA can be adequately minimized. The ATET, which is the
estimator that is subject to selection bias, when estimated using the MBE is expressed
as4:

𝛼𝐴𝑇𝐸,𝑀𝐵𝐸 = [

∑𝑖∈Ω

𝑌𝑖 𝑇𝑖
𝑃̂ (𝑋𝑖 )

⁄
∑𝑖∈Ω

𝑇𝑖 ]
𝑃̂ (𝑋𝑖 )

−[

∑𝑖∈Ω

𝑌𝑖 (1−𝑇𝑖 )
1−𝑃̂ (𝑋𝑖 )

⁄
∑𝑖∈Ω

1−𝑇𝑖 ]
1−𝑃̂ (𝑋𝑖 )

(15)

Where Ω = 𝑖|𝑃̂(𝑋𝑖 ) ∈ 𝐶(𝑃∗ ) and 𝐶(𝑃∗ ) symbolizes the neighborhood of propensity
scores around P* (Millimet and Tchernis, 2013). More specifically, 𝐶(𝑃∗ )is
mathematically expressed as 𝐶(𝑃∗ ) = [𝑃̂(𝑋𝑖 )|𝑃̂(𝑋𝑖 ) ∈ (𝑃, 𝑃)], where (𝑃, 𝑃) is the
interval in which a certain percentage of the control and treatment groups’ propensity
scores must fall into P* (Millimet and Tchernis, 2013). To estimate P*, Ω must be
derived. Millimet and Tchernis propose using Heckman’s bivariate normal selection
model to estimate Ω.
The ATET using the MBE is expressed as:

𝛼𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑇,𝑀𝐵𝐸 (𝑃 ∗) = ∑𝑖∈Ω 𝑌𝑖 𝑇𝑖 − [

∑𝑖∈Ω

𝑌𝑖 (1−𝑇𝑖 )𝑃̂ (𝑋𝑖 )
1−𝑃̂ (𝑋𝑖 )

⁄
(1−𝑇𝑖 )𝑃̂(𝑋𝑖 )]
∑𝑖∈Ω
̂
1−𝑃 (𝑋𝑖 )

The ATET can be calculated without estimating P* (Millimet and Tchernis, 2013).

4

See Millimet and Tchernis (2013) for detailed mathematical derivations.
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(16)

Following Peel (2018), the MBE is used to check the robustness of the traditional
propensity-score matching treatment effects estimates, thereby assessing the threat of
unobserved selection bias. The CIA is strengthened if the MBE treatment effect estimate
is similar and significant, while the presence of an unobserved correlated variable is
detected if the MBE treatment effect estimate is still significant, but not similar to PSM
estimates (Millimet and Tchernis, 2013; Peel, 2018).
Limitations and Other Considerations
A limitation posed PSM is that it typically must utilize a smaller sample size,
which therefore reduces the power of the statistical tests conducted. However, unless the
PSM technique is employed with an already small sample size, this should not cause any
issues in terms of the validity of the PSM treatment effects estimates. In this analysis,
authorized (treated) individuals are matched with unauthorized (untreated) individuals
using the nearest-neighbor matching technique with replacement. The MBE further trims
the sample to include only observations with a propensity score within a certain interval
around the BMPS (Millimet and Tchernis, 2013; McCarthy, Millimet, and Tchernis,
2014; Peel, 2018).
Another limitation of PSM, and subsequently the MBE, occurs due to the fact that
observations that are not on the common support are discarded. The observed difference
in MBE and PSM treatment effects estimates may in part be due to heterogeneity that
occurs from individuals’ different responses to selection into treatment (Peel, 2018).
However, according to Millimet and Tchernis (2013 p. 988), unobserved bias is still
minimized using the MBE because it identifies the parameter that can be estimated with
least amount of bias.
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CHAPTER V
DATA
The data utilized in this study comes from the National Agricultural Workers
Survey (NAWS) and spans from 1989 to 2014. The NAWS is an employment-based,
random survey of U.S. crop workers. Demographic, employment, and health data are
collected via face-to-face interviews conducted directly with hired crop farm workers. A
multistage sampling process is used, and the survey is conducted in three different cycles
per year to reflect the seasonal nature of agricultural employment and production (U.S.DOL, 2018).
The NAWS is one of few nationally representative datasets where respondents are
asked to self-report on legal status, focusing specifically on the agricultural sector.
Interviewed workers include only those who are currently employed by an eligible
establishment in crop and crop-related work. According to the NAWS, an eligible
establishment is one that is classified within the North American Industrial Classification
System as Crop Production (NAICS code 111) or Support Activities for Crop Production
(NAICS code 11151) (Hernandez, Gabbard, and Carroll, 2016). Workers involved in preharvest, post-harvest, and harvesting tasks are eligible to be interviewed, as well as
workers in supervisory positions and those who work as machinery operators. The
NAWS dataset excludes H-2A workers as well as workers who have been out of
agricultural work for over one year (Hernandez, Gabbard, and Carroll, 2016). Once
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respondents indicate legal status, or lack thereof, the respondents are then asked questions
in order to cross-check the answer to help minimize potential reporting bias. Answers
must be consistent and must conform with visa regulations (Hernandez, Gabbard, and
Carroll, 2016).
Figure 1 depicts the NAWS Cropping Regions, which separates the country into
six distinct crop regions (East, Southeast, Midwest, Southwest, Northwest, and
California) for survey interviews. Since the first round of surveys began in 1989, over
61,000 crop workers have been interviewed in 612 counties and 46 states (Hernandez,
Gabbard, and Carroll, 2016).

Figure 1

NAWS Crop Regions
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Characterization of the Estimation Sample
The total estimation sample (N=11,958) was drawn from the National
Agricultural Workers Survey included on foreign-born, FVH farmworkers from 19892014. Of the total sample, 7,851 observations lacked proper U.S. work authorized, while
4,107 observations had some type of legal status. Restricting the sample to only include
California farmworkers (N=5,927), 2,207 observations had some type of legal status,
while 3,720 observations did not. Grouping the other NAWS crop regions together,
excluding California, yielded a total sample of 6,031 observations, of which, 1,900
observations had legal status and 4,131 observations did not.
Demographics
Tables 1 through 3 provide demographical summary statistics for the estimation
sample at the national level (Table 1), for California (Table 2), and for all other regions
grouped together (Table 3) for the years 1989-2014. Nationally, authorized foreign-born
crop workers on average were older (45.5 years) than unauthorized workers (32.8 years).
A higher percentage of authorized workers were female (23%) and a higher percentage of
authorized workers were married (78%). In terms of educational attainment, 31% of
authorized workers had attained some level of elementary education, 35% had attained at
least some level of middle school education, 25% had attained at least some level of high
school education, and 3% had received college-level schooling. For the unauthorized
cohort, 23% had attained some level of elementary education, 38 % had attained some
level of middle school education, 31% had obtained some level of high school education,
and 2% had attended college. A higher percentage (40%) of authorized workers had
attended adult-education classes; 22% of unauthorized workers had attended adult30

education classes. A higher percentage of unauthorized workers were of Hispanic
ethnicity (98%), with the vast majority of unauthorized workers having been born in
Mexico (97%).
Regarding California’s foreign-born crop farm labor force (Table 2), unauthorized
workers in California were slightly younger (32.6 years) than the national average, and
authorized workers were slightly older (46 years) than the national average. A lower
percentage of both legal statuses were female, whereas a higher percentage of both legal
statuses were married. Comparing educational attainment averages, the California
averages are similar to the national averages in Table 1. Roughly the same percentage of
authorized and unauthorized workers in California were of Hispanic ethnicity and were
Mexican-born when compared to national averages.
The regions included in the grouping of the regions include the East, Southeast,
Southwest, Midwest, and Northwest. Summary statistics characterizing the demographics
of foreign-born farmworkers in the regions listed above are presented in Table 3.
Authorized farmworkers were younger (44.8 years) whereas unauthorized farmworkers
were older (32.9 years) than the national and California averages for the two groups. A
higher percentage of both legal statuses were female and were married. Educational
attainment for both groups were similar to California and national averages, as were the
amount of workers in both statuses that were of Hispanic ethnicity and Mexican-born.
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Employment Characteristics
Tables 4, 5, and 6 report summary statistics relating to various employment
variables for authorized and unauthorized foreign-born farmworkers at the national level
(Table 4), for California (Table 5), and for all other regions (Table 6) from 1989-2014.
Nationally, foreign-born authorized farmworkers’ inflation adjusted earnings are roughly
$1.10 more, on average, than unauthorized farmworkers. Authorized workers reported
being in the U.S. for roughly 25.18 years, whereas unauthorized workers reported being
in the U.S. for roughly 10.62 years on average. Authorized workers have a greater
amount of U.S. farmwork experience (22.11 years) when compared to their unauthorized
counterparts (9.38 years). Unauthorized workers spent a greater number of weeks abroad,
and a greater percentage of unauthorized workers were hired by a farm labor contractor
as opposed to being hired directly by the grower. A higher percentage of authorized
workers were able to speak English. In terms of type of work task (pre-harvest, harvest,
post-harvest, semi-skilled, or supervisor), a larger percentage of unauthorized workers
were employed to perform pre-harvest (66%), harvest (75%), post-harvest (64%), or
semi-skilled (59%) tasks when compared to authorized workers, who were largely hired
to perform supervisory tasks (86%).
In California (Table 5), wages for both legal status categories were higher than the
national averages, as was the number of years since immigration. Authorized and
unauthorized workers had more U.S. farmwork experience, and a higher percentage of
both categories were employed by farm labor contractors. In terms of types of tasks,
California farmworkers follow the same trend as shown in Table 4, with a higher
percentage of unauthorized workers being hired to perform pre-harvest (64%), harvest
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(75%), post-harvest (54%), or semi-skilled (57%) tasks, whereas a higher percentage of
authorized workers had been employed to perform supervisory tasks (89%).
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Table 1

Demographical Summary Statistics – National Level (1989-2014)

Age
Female
Married
No Educational Attainment
Elementary Education
Middle School Education
High School Education
College Education
Attended Adult-Ed Classes
Hispanic Ethnicity
Mexican-Born
N

Table 2

Authorized
Mean Std. Dev.
45.50
11.74
0.23
0.42
0.78
0.41
0.06
0.24
0.31
0.46
0.35
0.48
0.25
0.43
0.03
0.17
0.40
0.49
0.90
0.30
0.89
0.31
4,107

All
Mean Std. Dev.
37.15
12.28
0.22
0.41
0.66
0.47
0.06
0.23
0.26
0.44
0.37
0.48
0.29
0.45
0.02
0.15
0.28
0.45
0.95
0.22
0.95
0.23
11,958

Demographical Summary Statistics – California (1989-2014)

Age
Female
Married
No Educational Attainment
Elementary Education
Middle School Education
High School Education
College Education
Attended Adult-Ed Classes
Hispanic Ethnicity
Mexican-Born
N

Table 3

Unauthorized
Mean Std. Dev.
32.79
10.11
0.21
0.41
0.59
0.49
0.06
0.23
0.23
0.42
0.38
0.49
0.31
0.46
0.02
0.14
0.22
0.41
0.98
0.15
0.97
0.16
7,851

Unauthorized
Mean
Std. Dev.
32.68
10.18
0.19
0.40
0.61
0.49
0.05
0.23
0.22
0.41
0.39
0.49
0.31
0.46
0.02
0.12
0.20
0.40
0.98
0.14
0.98
0.14
3,270

Authorized
Mean
Std. Dev.
46.07
11.36
0.22
0.41
0.81
0.39
0.06
0.23
0.33
0.47
0.36
0.48
0.22
0.42
0.03
0.16
0.39
0.49
0.90
0.30
0.90
0.30
2,207

Demographical Summary Statistics – All Other Regions (1989-2014)
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Age
Female
Married
No Educational Attainment
Elementary Education
Middle School Education
High School Education
College Education
Hispanic Ethnicity
Attended Adult-Ed Classes
Mexican-Born
N

Table 4

Authorized
Mean
Std. Dev.
44.83
12.14
0.25
0.43
0.75
0.43
0.07
0.25
0.30
0.46
0.33
0.47
0.27
0.44
0.03
0.18
0.90
0.31
0.40
0.49
0.89
0.32
1,900

Employment Summary Statistics – National Level (1989-2014)

Hourly Wage (2014 $)
Years Since Immigration
Seasonal Labor
Skilled Labor
U.S. Farmwork Experience
U.S. Farmwork Experience, sq.
Annual Farmwork Weeks
Annual Weeks Abroad
Annual Non-Farmwork Weeks
Employed by Farm Labor Contractor
English Speaking Ability
Pre-Harvest
Harvest
Post-Harvest
Semi-Skilled
Supervisor
N

Table 5

Unauthorized
Mean
Std. Dev.
32.89
10.03
0.23
0.42
0.58
0.49
0.06
0.23
0.24
0.43
0.37
0.48
0.31
0.46
0.02
0.15
0.97
0.17
0.23
0.42
0.97
0.18
4,131

Unauthorized
Mean
Std. Dev.
9.51
2.51
10.62
7.66
0.42
0.49
0.31
0.46
9.38
6.79
134.11
188.86
40.98
13.55
3.40
9.86
2.13
7.85
0.17
0.38
0.44
0.50
0.66
0.47
0.75
0.44
0.64
0.48
0.59
0.49
0.14
0.36
7,851

Authorized
Mean
Std. Dev.
10.66
3.36
25.18
10.32
0.44
0.50
0.40
0.49
22.11
10.90
607.70
503.35
40.99
12.24
2.22
6.32
1.94
7.61
0.12
0.33
0.65
0.48
0.34
0.47
0.25
0.44
0.36
0.48
0.41
0.49
0.86
0.36
4,107

Employment Summary Statistics – California (1989-2014)
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Hourly Wage (2014 $)
Years Since Immigration
Seasonal Labor
Skilled Labor
U.S. Farmwork Experience
U.S. Farmwork Experience, sq.
Annual Farmwork Weeks
Annual Weeks Abroad
Annual Non-Farmwork Weeks
Employed by Farm Labor Contractor
English Speaking Ability
Pre-Harvest
Harvest
Post-Harvest
Semi-Skilled
Supervisor
N

Table 6

Unauthorized
Mean
Std. Dev.
9.54
2.23
10.63
7.91
0.47
0.50
0.36
0.48
9.59
6.99
140.77
197.72
40.13
13.44
3.99
10.80
1.62
6.89
0.31
0.46
0.36
0.48
0.64
0.48
0.75
0.43
0.54
0.50
0.57
0.50
0.11
0.33
3,270

Authorized
Mean
Std. Dev.
10.76
3.43
26.11
9.99
0.49
0.50
0.46
0.50
23.52
10.68
667.45
514.91
41.06
11.75
1.60
5.13
1.53
6.84
0.21
0.40
0.61
0.49
0.36
0.48
0.25
0.43
0.46
0.50
0.43
0.50
0.89
0.33
2,207

Employment Summary Statistics – All Other Regions (1989-2014)
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Hourly Wage (2014 $)
Years Since Immigration
Seasonal Labor
Skilled Labor
U.S. Farmwork Experience
U.S. Farmwork Experience, sq.
Annual Farmwork Weeks
Annual Weeks Abroad
Annual Non-Farmwork Weeks
Employed by Farm Labor Contractor
English Speaking Ability
Pre-Harvest
Harvest
Post-Harvest
Semi-Skilled
Supervisor
N

Unauthorized
Mean
Std. Dev.
9.49
2.73
10.62
7.43
0.36
0.48
0.27
0.44
9.19
6.61
128.10
180.33
41.75
13.60
2.87
8.90
2.58
8.59
0.05
0.21
0.51
0.50
0.68
0.47
0.74
0.44
0.70
0.46
0.62
0.49
0.20
0.45
4,131
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Authorized
Mean
Std. Dev.
10.53
3.27
24.10
10.60
0.38
0.49
0.33
0.47
20.47
10.92
538.29
480.47
40.92
12.79
2.94
7.40
2.41
8.39
0.02
0.15
0.70
0.46
0.32
0.47
0.26
0.44
0.30
0.46
0.38
0.49
0.80
0.45
1,900

CHAPTER VI
ESTIMATION RESULTS
Table 7 includes descriptions of the variables used in the logistic regression to
determine the propensity scores. Variables included in the logit model to predict legal
status include: age, experience, experience squared, English-speaking ability, whether the
farmworker was hired by a farm labor contractor (FLC), whether the farmworker was
employed seasonally, the annual number of farmwork weeks, the annual number of
weeks spent abroad, the number of years since the farmworker immigrated to the U.S. for
the first time, educational attainment, if the farmworker entered the U.S. after 1986, and
if the farmworker entered the U.S. after 2001.
The selected variables have been used previously in the literature to determine
legal status, and there are notable differences between the authorized and unauthorized in
terms of means. The last two variables, after 1986 and after 2001, distinguish between
two time periods. Following Walters, Emerson and Iwai (2008) the first indicates
whether the farm worker first entered the United States to live or work, and is included to
reflect legalization through the Special Agricultural Worker (SAW) program that those
farmworkers who were already living in the United States and working prior to the 1986
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) being passed, and the relative difficulty of
acquiring legal status since that time. The after 2001 variable reflects farmworker entry
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to the United States pre and post 2001; in the post-9/11 period following the terror
attacks, immigration enforcement (border and interior) was significantly increased.
The results of the logit specification for the U.S., California, and all other regions
are reported in Table 8. Most of the signs on the coefficients are as expected. An
immigrant worker is more likely to be authorized to work in the U.S. if the worker is
older in age, is proficient with the English language, and is employed seasonally.
Additionally, the worker is more likely to be authorized if the worker has resided in the
U.S. for a longer period (as captured by the ‘years since immigration’ variable), has more
overall U.S. farmwork experience, and has more formal education. On the other hand, a
worker is more likely to be unauthorized if the worker exhibits a higher number of annual
farmwork weeks and is hired by a FLC (as opposed to being employed directly by the
grower). This finding on annual farmwork weeks may reflect that many unauthorized
immigrants work a greater number of hours in farm work weekly than authorized
immigrant workers, and perhaps because they may not have the same degree of job
mobility (in and out of farm work) as their authorized cohorts likely would. Additionally,
the logit results indicate if the worker entered the U.S. for the first time to live or work
after 1986 or 2001, they were more likely to be unauthorized. The results are broadly
consistent with Walters, Emerson and Iwai (2008). On this particular finding, they
concluded this reflected that indicated that immigrant farmworkers following these
periods were more likely to be undocumented than otherwise, given the restrictions that
were put in place after both of these periods, and heightened enforcement after 2001.
The logit model was used to predict the legal status of the worker based on
calculated propensity scores to test its accuracy. The model correctly classified 83.93% of
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observations nationally, 82.83% of observations in California, and 84.84% of
observations in all other regions. Figures 2-4 graphically display the distribution of
propensity scores pre-matching and post-matching. Evidenced in figure 4, the
distributions of propensity score for the matched sample of unauthorized workers is very
similar to the distribution of propensity scores for authorized workers (see figure 3),
implying that the two groups have similar characteristics.
Table 9 summarizes the bias present in mean differences before and after
matching. There were statistically significant differences in the means of all the variables
in the unmatched sample. After matching based on propensity scores generated by the
logit specification, there were no significant differences in the means of all of the
variables, and the average total bias decreased from 72.9% to 6.3%.
Table 10 presents the estimated propensity-score matching treatment effects
parameters at the national level, for California only, and all other regions excluding
California. The wage differences and percentage differences in each region (i.e. national,
California, or all other regions) are differences relative to the average wage in each
respective area. At the national level, the estimated average treatment on the treated, or
the estimated benefit that workers who selected into treatment (gained authorization)
would experience, on average, is $0.89. This means that the average benefit from
selecting into treatment is associated with an $0.89 increase in the average wage rate.
Translating the national wage difference into percentage terms, the average treatment on
the treated yielded a 7% increase in the average national wage. The national ATET is
broadly comparable to findings from Walters, Emerson, and Iwai (2008) and Kandilov
and Kandilov (2010).
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Additionally, overall, our findings are consistent with those of previous work that
have assessed the wage implications of legal status for foreign-born farmwokers (Taylor,
1992; Isé and Perloff, 1995; Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark, 2002; Iwai, Emerson, and
Walters, 2006). In California, the average treatment on the treated is higher than the
national effect, with workers who selected into treatment experiencing a $1.09 increase in
average wages, which translates into a 9% increase in wage rates of California foreignborn farmworkers. Matching performed using observations from all other regions yielded
an average treatment effect of $0.65, or roughly a 5% increase in average wage rates of
farmworkers found in regions other than California. The average treatment effect on the
treated is significant at the national level, for workers in California, and for workers
grouped in all other regions excluding California.
The average treatment effect on the untreated (the effect that untreated workers
would experience if they sought treatment), is only significant at the national level. The
average treatment effect on the untreated at a national level is an estimated $0.29, or a
2%, increase in average wage rates. For untreated workers in California, there is an
estimated $0.49, or 5%, increase in average California wage rates. In the group
encompassing workers in all other regions, there is an estimated $0.02, or a 0.7%,
increase in average wage rates.
The estimated average treatment effect (the wage effect that a worker selected at
random to receive treatment would experience) is positive and significant nationally, as
well as in California and for the group of all other regions. The national average
treatment effect is estimated to be a $0.49, or 4%, increase in wages. For California
workers, the average treatment effect is estimated to be higher than the national effect,
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with the randomly selected worker experiencing a $0.71, or 6%, increase in wage rates
due to receiving the treatment. In the all other regions grouping, the average worker could
expect an estimated $0.22, or 2%, increase in wage rates.
Results from the minimum-biased estimation technique are reported and
compared to the treatment effects estimates calculated from propensity score matching
techniques in Table 11. The results are presented in terms of percentage differences
between the wages of the treated (authorized) and untreated (unauthorized), and are
interpreted as suggested by Peel (2018).
Comparison of the PSM and MBE methods indicate, in general, that immigrant
workers who select into legal status for US farm work earn higher wages than the average
immigrant worker who gains legal status, and more than the average undocumented
immigrant worker. At the national level, the PSM reports that those immigrant
farmworkers who selected into legal status (ATETPSM) earn wages that are 3% higher
than the average immigrant worker who randomly gained legal status (ATEPSM), and 5%
higher than those who remained undocumented (ATUPSM). This gap is shown to narrow
to 2% in both of the latter cases, when the MBE is used to account for selection bias that
arises from unobserved sources – which may be peculiar characteristics about the
workers or labor market conditions that are unknown to the researcher.
A similar direction of effect is apparent for California, and the magnitude of the
gap is the same for the ATETPSM and the ATEPSM. However, the gap between the
estimates for the ATETMBE and the ATUMBE is much lower (1%) than that the ATETPSM
and ATUPSM (4%). This suggests that the PSM would largely overstate the effect of legal
status on the wages for authorized versus unauthorized workers. Also interesting, while
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the ATETPSM and ATEPSM for the combined regions show the same magnitude of
difference, the largest gap of the three regions modeled in the analysis is apparent: the
ATETPSM is 4.3% higher than the ATUPSM. However, this effect disappears when for the
MB estimates of these population means. This appears to underscore the importance of
recognizing that there are likely unobserved characteristics driving the selection bias,
which would result in the wage implications of legal status being overestimated, if
ignored.
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Table 7

Explanatory Variables in Logit Specification

Variables
Age

Definition
Age of farm worker at time of interview

U.S. Farmwork Experience

Years of U.S. Farmwork

U.S. Farmwork Experience,
sq.

Years of U.S Farmwork squared

English-Speaking Ability

=1 if worker has the ability to speak English =0 if
worker does not

Employed by Farm Labor
Contractor

=1 if worker is employed by FLC
=0 if worker is not

Seasonal Labor

=1 if worker is classified as seasonal labor
=0 if worker is not

Annual Farmwork Weeks

Number of weeks worked on-farm during the last year

Annual Weeks Spent
Abroad

Number of weeks spent outside of the U.S. during the
last year

Years Since Immigration

Number of years since worker entered the U.S. to live or
work for the first time

Educational Attainment

Number of years of traditional schooling

Entered U.S. after 1986

=1 if worker entered the U.S. for the first time after 1986
=0 if entered before 1986

Entered U.S. after 2001

=1 if worker entered the U.S. for the first time after 2001
=0 if entered before 2001
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Table 8

Propensity Score Logit Specification

Variables
Age
U.S. Farmwork
Experience
U.S. Farmwork
Experience, sq.
English-Speaking Ability
Employed by FLC
Seasonal Labor
Annual Farmwork Weeks
Annual Weeks Spent
Abroad
Years Since Immigration
Educational Attainment
Entered U.S. after 1986
Entered U.S. after 2001
Constant

National
0.0207
(0.0034)
0.0118

***

(0.0127)
0.000853
(0.000357)
0.468
(0.0584)
-0.3240
(0.0792)
0.1560
(0.0577)
-0.0168
(0.0024)
-0.0066
(0.0041)
0.0561
(0.0072)
0.0755
(0.0087)
-1.525
(0.0940)
-0.3270
(0.1000)
-1.7270
(0.2360)

**
***
***
***
***

***
***
***
***
***

Coefficients
California
All Other Regions
0.0103
**
0.0282
***
(0.0051)
(0.0044)
0.0370
**
-0.0163
(0.0181)
0.0003
(0.0004)
0.6510
(0.0838)
-0.4070
(0.0915)
0.1980
(0.0835)
-0.0257
(0.0036)
-0.0293
(0.0068)
0.0436
(0.0105)
0.0438
(0.0116)
-1.9230
(0.1360)
-0.5240
(0.1520)
-0.4150
(0.3450)

Observations
11,956
5,927
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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(0.0174)
0.0013
***
***
**
***
***
***
***
***
***

(0.0005)
0.4000
(0.0807)
-0.6690
(0.227)
0.0078
(0.0790)
-0.0099
(0.0032)
0.0110
(0.0052)
0.0752
(0.0099)
0.1060
(0.0116)
-1.1130
(0.1290)
-0.1550
(0.1310)
-2.9000
(0.3200)
6,031

***
***
***

***

***
***
***

***
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Matched

-14.1%***
160.3%***
-12.2%***
-153.8%***
-89.7%***
72.9%

3.40
10.62
6.59
0.94
0.41

42.9%***
-13.8%***
5.4%***

0.44
0.17
0.41
0.5%

125.0%***

134.23

40.95

141.1%***

0.06

0.36

6.15

25.18

2.24

41.02

0.64
0.12
0.44

608.65

22.16

0.06

0.37

7.49

25.07

2.28

40.98

0.61
0.13
0.45

573.78

21.22

Bias
Authorized Unauthorized
116.5%***
45.53
45.20

9.35

Authorized Unauthorized
45.53
32.89

Unmatched

Presence of Bias: Unmatched and Matched Samples

Age
U.S. Farmwork
Experience
22.16
U.S. Farmwork
Experience, sq.
608.65
English-Speaking
Ability
0.64
Employed by FLC
0.12
Seasonal
0.44
Annual Farmwork
Weeks
41.02
Annual Weeks
Abroad
2.24
Years Since
Immigration
25.18
Educational
Attainment
6.15
Entered U.S. after
1986
0.36
Entered U.S. after
2001
0.06
Mean Total Bias
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

Variable

Table 9

-1.0%
6.3%

-3.1%

-37.2%

1.2%

-0.5%

0.3%

6.3%
-2.2%
-2.0%

9.2%

10.3%

Bias
2.8%

98.9%

98.0%

-204.8%

99.3%

96.9%

43.3%

85.3%
84.3%
63.3%

92.7%

92.7%

97.6%

% of Bias
Reduction
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National
Wage Differential % Differential
$0.89***
7%***
$0.29**
2%**
$0.49***
4%***
------------------------$0.40
3%

California
Wage Differential % Differential
$1.09***
9%***
$0.49*
5%*
$0.71***
6%***
--------------------------$0.39
3%

Propensity Score Matching Treatment Effects Estimation

Bias-Minimizing Treatment Effects Estimation

0.0007
6,031

All Other Regions
Wage Differential % Differential
$0.65***
5%***
$0.02
0.7%
$0.22*
2%*
-------------------------$.43
3%

National
California
All Other Regions
PSM
MBE
PSM
MBE
PSM
MBE
ATET 7%*** 5%*** 9%*** 5%*** 5%*** 3%***
ATU
2%*
3%**
5%
4%*** 0.7%
1%
ATE
4%*** 3%*** 6%*** 3%***
2%*
3%***
N
11,958
5,927
6,031
Asterisks denote significance - ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10

Table 11

ATET
ATU
ATE
---------------Sorting Gains1
Matching
Distance2
0.0003
0.0009
N
11,958
5,927
Asterisks denote significance - ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10
1
Sorting gains = ATET – ATE
2
Matching distance =abs[ propensity score – propensity score of nearest neighbor]

Table 10
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CHAPTER VII
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
The purpose of this study was to analyze the wage implications of legalization on
foreign-born U.S. crop farm worker wages at the national level, in California, and in a
grouping of the other five NAWS crop regions. Using PSM and MBE, three population
means were estimated: (1) the average treatment effect, (2) the average treatment effect
on the treated, and (3) the average treatment effect on the untreated. This study
contributes to the literature in two ways: first, it assesses the potential wage outcomes on
the national relative to regional levels. This was not assessed previously by past studies.
Second, this study uses the minimum-biased estimator (MBE) proposed by Millimet and
Tchernis (2013) as a robustness check for unobserved selection-bias. To the authors’
knowledge, the minimum-biased estimator has not be applied in the context of this
particular research problem. Previous work has acknowledged selection bias that arises
from observed sources, but has not explicitly addressed when it arises from unobserved
sources.
Due to the non-randomization of the treatment (legal status), an individual either
selects into treatment based on observable characteristics or selects into treatment based
on unobservable characteristics or based on a mixture of both. This study employs
treatment effects estimation methods under the assumption that farmworkers select into
legalization based both on observables (via propensity score matching) and
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unobservables (via minimum-biased estimation). The strength of the estimates provided
through propensity score matching rests on the conditional independence assumption,
which signifies that selection into treatment is random conditional upon a specified vector
of covariates. If the conditional independence assumption fails to hold, propensity score
estimates become subject to selection bias. To detect the presence of selection on
unobservables, and to provide the treatment effect estimate with the least bias (assuming
the conditional independence assumption fails to hold), minimum-biased estimators are
employed. Propensity scores were calculated via a logistical regression and authorized
observations with were matched with unauthorized counterparts based on similar
covariates.
Results from the matching show that there are statistically significant positive
wage effects at the national level as well as for California and the rest of the United
States. California is singled out for comparison as a major specialty crop producing state5
with high labor intensity relative to the rest of the United States. California, as a single
crop state/region in the NAWS data, has a large immigrant workforce, much of which is
unauthorized for US employment. The average treatment effect on the treated is largest
in California at $1.09 more for authorized workers relative to unauthorized, while the
wage effect for all other regions is $0.65. The national wage effect of authorization is
$0.89. The average treatment effect (the wage effect that a randomly selected worker
would experience if the work moved from unauthorized to authorized) is positive and
significant nationally ($0.49) as well as in California ($0.71) and all other regions

5

California is designated as a distinct crop region in the NAWS data.
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($0.22). The average treatment effect on the untreated is significant at the 5% level
nationally ($0.29) and at the 10% level for California ($0.49), but insignificant for all
other regions. As discussed in Caliendo (2006), the average treatment effect on the
untreated highlights the potential policy implications for the future. These results are a
signal of what could happen if policies were put in place to make it easier for
unauthorized workers to transition to authorized status or if another large-scale amnesty
program was targeted toward the agricultural industry.
California tends to stand out relative to the rest of the country in terms of the
impact of authorization on farm workers. The treatment effect is higher in California than
the rest of the country for both the ATET and the ATU. This is important because 44% of
all foreign farm workers are in California and California supplies roughly 50% of the
nation’s fresh fruits and vegetables (Martin 2014). The political climate is also different
in California relative to much of the rest of the country. Immigration laws have been
enforced more leniently in California and state-level laws tend to be more favorable for
undocumented workers in California relative to much of the rest of the country. This is
widely documented in various media reports (Ramakrishnan and Colbern, 2015; Garcias,
2017; FindLaw, 2018). Clearly, this may create a unique environment for farm workers in
the state, in that it could potentially be easier to gain legal status. Furthermore, from an
econometric standpoint, sample size considerations played a role in determining how to
split the data for analysis. The sample size for each individual region in the NAWS
dataset, with the exception of California, was too small for the minimum-biased
estimation to properly run.
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The order of the magnitude of the estimates (ATET>ATE>ATU) indicates
positive sorting regarding the gains from obtaining legal status. Foreign-born farm
workers who had taken deliberate actions to obtain legal status gained more from it than
the average, randomly-selected worker, and more than those that were unauthorized. This
suggests that farm workers may be weighing the benefits of obtaining work authorization
with the costs of becoming authorized. Arguably, those who stand to gain the most may
tend to become authorized while those who are likely to gain the least may opt to remain
unauthorized. In the latter case, it is possible for there to be unique factors that may
disqualify the immigrant worker, that are unobserved by the researcher. The process to
become legalized is known to be time and effort intensive, as well as expensive and
requires a knowledge of how to navigate the process of obtaining some type of legal
status (i.e. green card, legal permanent resident, permanent U.S. citizen). For the average
unskilled and undocumented farm worker, legal status may not be an option. Further, the
average undocumented worker may also perceive it as risky, in that it could potentially
increase detection and deportation risks. Clearly, these are factors that may not be easily
documented on any survey or observed by researchers, although they could impact
undocumented workers.
Focusing on the minimum-biased (MBE) estimates relative to the propensity
score (PSM) estimates, PSM estimates were higher than MB estimates. This suggests the
PSM method overstates the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) (nationally, in
California, and in all other regions), the average treatment effect on the untreated
(California), and the average treatment effect (nationally and California), due to
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unobserved variables that are correlated with both the outcome and treatment. If the
variable(s) could be included in the analysis, the PSM estimate would likely be lower.
The PSM estimate of the average treatment effect on to the untreated (ATU)
(national), and the average treatment effect (all other regions) was lower than the MBE
suggesting that the PSM estimate is understated due to unobserved correlated variable(s).
In the case of a PSM overstatement of the effect, the unobserved variable is positively
correlated with both the outcome variable and the treatment variable. Conversely, in the
case of a PSM understatement of the effect, the unobserved variable is positively
correlated with the outcome variable and negatively correlated with the treatment
variable (Peel, 2018). The awareness of the presence of selection bias due to
unobservable factors shows the importance of utilizing methods that correct for such bias.
Beginning with the average treatment effect on the treated, the MBE estimate is
lower than the PSM in all three regional specifications. Like the ATETPSM estimate, the
ATETMBE estimate is significant, signifying that the ATETPSM is overestimated due to the
presence of an unobserved correlated variable. The minimum-biased estimate for the
average treatment effect on the untreated is higher than the ATUPSM estimates, and
significant in California, unlike the ATUPSM estimate for California. This implies that the
ATUPSM estimates are underestimated nationally and in the group containing all other
regions, whereas ATUPSM estimates are overestimated in California.
Regarding the average treatment effect, the ATEMBE estimates are all significant,
however, the ATEMBE estimates are lower nationally and in California, implying that the
ATEPSM estimates are potentially overestimated due to the presence of an unobserved
correlated variable. In the all other regions grouping, the ATEMBE estimate is higher,
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suggesting that the ATEPSM estimate could be underestimated due to an unobserved
correlated variable. In sum, these results appear to suggest that studies that do not address
this particular source of bias would overestimate that wage implications of legal status,
and, by extension, the potential hired labor cost increases.
Evaluating the precise economic implications of legalization for foreign born
workers in the US economy can be challenging considering the myriad data collection
and estimation issues that arise, not to mention the dynamic political environment in
which legislation on the state and national levels are made. Foreign-born individuals who
seek employment would make such decisions based on a variety of factors, only some of
which some are actually observable. There may be certain additional characteristics,
behaviors and attitudes of immigrant workers, and/or conditions of the work
environment, the labor market and the immigration policy environment that may need to
be taken into account. The regional analysis conducted in this study was restricted to two
regions – California and all other regions – due to sample size restrictions during the
minimum-biased estimation. Future research could focus on addressing this issue and, if
successful, analyze the effects across more regions, to ascertain how these may differ
accordingly, particularly in light of the implementation of various immigration initiatives
at the state level. Additionally, future research could attempt to assess the regional
effects using other comprehensive data sets, if available. Although such analyses may be
sensitive to the methods of estimation, they would contribute to greater understanding of
potential impacts of immigration reform, especially if it were to affect the supply of
workers and hired labor costs. This is crucial for labor intensive sectors in US agriculture,
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given the ramifications that it could have for agricultural investment and production
decisions and producer livelihoods.
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Table 12

Propensity Score Matching Treatment Estimation – National

Sample
Treated Controls Difference S. E. T-Stat
Unmatched 10.66
9.51
1.14
0.05 21.03
ATT
10.66
9.76
0.89
0.11 8.29
ATU
9.51
9.79
0.28
0.13 2.26
ATE
0.49
0.10 5.17

Table 13

Propensity Score Matching Treatment Estimation – California

Sample
Treated Controls Difference S. E. T-Stat
Unmatched 10.76
9.54
1.23
0.07 16.68
ATT
10.76
9.67
1.09
0.14 7.85
ATU
9.54
10.04
0.50
0.25 1.97
ATE
0.72
0.17 4.16

Table 14

P-Value
0.0001
0.0001
0.0432
0.0002

P-Value
0.0001
0.0001
0.0724
0.0013

Propensity Score Matching Treatment Effects Estimation – All Other
Regions

Sample
Treated Controls Difference S. E. T-Stat
Unmatched 10.53
9.49
1.04
0.08 12.93
ATT
10.53
9.87
0.65
0.15 4.46
ATU
9.49
9.51
0.02
0.13 0.19
ATE
0.22
0.11 2.03
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P-Value
0.0001
0.0008
0.8525
0.0651

